Organizations today outsource diverse business processes to achieve a wide variety of business objectives ranging from reduction of costs to innovation and business transformation.
Introduction ^^^ ^^ H
Business process outsourcing (BPO) refers to of one or more information technology processes to an external service provider (R 2006; W?lenweber et al. 2008 ). Business p the manipulation of either physical or infor (Davenport and Short 1990) . Outsourcing constitutes contract manufacturing and is di Thus, in this study, business processes com interrelated activities that exchange or trans Dorothy Leidner was the accepting senior editor for this paper. Ravi Bapna served as the associate editor. MIS Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 39-62/March 2010 39 mation to create value. IT is integral to process execution and management in BPO. This is true of transactional processes such as administration or processing services, where IT performs simple automation or process updates, as well as more strategic processes such as customer analytics or financial planning, where IT facilitates linkages with other processes and delivers business information to process workers in a timely fashion.
Given its dependence on IT, BPO shares important attributes with information technology outsourcing (ITO). Yet, there are important distinctions between these two outsourcing forms, namely, the objectives driving the outsourcing deci sion. Prior research (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 2001; W?llenweber et al. 2008 ) and industry surveys attribute the adoption of ITO to two primary factors: a focus on core competencies of the firm and reduction of IT costs. On the other hand, BPO involves significant diversity in outsourcing objectives, ranging from reduction in operating costs to innovation and business transformation (Linder et al. 2002) .
This range of BPO objectives reflects significant hetero geneity in the nature and strategic context of outsourced business processes.
As a consequence of this heterogeneity, each business process must be analyzed based on its underlying attributes. A busi ness process is unique in its analyzability (e.g., high and low analyzability of tax management and customer experience management respectively), dynamism (e.g., high and low dynamism of product development and payroll processing respectively), or interdependence with other organizational processes (e.g., high and low interdependence of financial planning and new credit card issuance respectively). These attributes, in turn, engender significant heterogeneity in the amount and frequency of information change that must be managed on an ongoing basis. For instance, processes such as benefits management or new credit card issuance are characterized by fewer and predictable information changes in the task environment. However, the execution of more strategic processes that involves direct interactions with customers in the downstream value chain (e.g., marketing campaign management), with suppliers in the upstream chain (e.g., logistics management), and with employees in support operations (e.g., training, financial planning) is characterized by more unpredictable information changes. Further, timely access to relevant information is critical in these interactions (e.g., access to billing information in addressing a customer query or access to sales and research and development information in new product development). A key premise of this study is that this unique nature of the outsourced process and its ensuing information needs are critical to developing prescriptions for BPO management.
Prior theoretical and empirical work on ITO management and performance, while providing a rich starting point to develop a model of BPO performance, is characterized by an important limitation: the specific nature of the outsourced task receives little attention (Dibbern et al. 2004 ). Perfor mance hinges on addressing appropriation concerns that arise from behavioral uncertainty perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the provider through contract design (Kern 1997; Willcocks and Kern 1998) or social exchange aspects such as trust and its underlying normative behaviors that act as self-enforcing safeguards (Grover et al. 1996; Marcolin and McLellan 1998) .2 These studies largely draw on transaction cost economics, agency theory, or social exchange theory to develop their arguments (Dibbern et al. 2004 ).
Yet, as we noted earlier, the very nature of the outsourced process requires attention in BPO. Bounded rationality, in addition to limiting the user firm's capacity to predict provider intent, also limits its ability to anticipate information changes in the outsourced process or formalize actions to respond to such change. The difference between adaptation problems engendered by relational and process uncertainty is understood in the strategy literature in terms of the difference between aligning interests (cooperation) and aligning actions (coordination) Heath and Staudenmayer 2000; Jacobides 2005) .3
This study takes into account the nature of the outsourced process by exploring the performance of BPO relationships through the lens of information processing. The information processing view of the firm (IPV) (Galbraith 1973 ) charac terizes firms as information processing networks with limited information processing capacities that are faced with different levels of uncertainty in their task environments. The objec tive of the firm is to design the right structure that facilitates the right amount of information needed to cope with task uncertainty and achieve desired performance. The focus of the IPV on task uncertainty as a basis for organization offers a sound means to capture the unique information requirements 2 Dibbern et al. (2004) find that the emphasis on these relational aspects is often to the exclusion of the contractual structure. This is likely because the relationship theories that form the basis for some of these studies contend that formal contracts may signal distrust of the exchange partner and, by undermining trust, encourage, rather than discourage, opportunistic behavior (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Ghoshal and Moran 1996). 3These studies explain that problems of cooperation arise from incentive conflict. However, problems of coordination arise due to the lack of shared knowledge about the "decision rules that others are likely to use" (Gulati et al. 2005, p. 419 ) and mutual interdependencies. Thus, the latter have their origin in cognitive conflict. of the outsourced process, which, in turn, determine the managerial challenges in the relationship and, hence, the information capabilities required for ongoing coordination of process decisions and tasks across firm boundaries. Thus, the IPV allows us to extend the focus of prior outsourcing research on the mutual exchange of rights to include the mutual exchange of information.
Building on research in the IPV tradition (Galbraith 1973; Tushman andNadler 1978) , we theorize that managerial effort in BPO involves the design of information capabilities (IC) that manage the idiosyncratic information requirements (IR) of the outsourced process4 in addition to appropriation con cerns. Thus, we expect that user firms will design IC that fit the IR of the BPO relationship. Further, user firms can expect significant performance gains from such effort. Tests of our hypotheses using survey data on 127 BPO relationships con firm that performance differences across BPO relationships arise as a function of the fit between the IR and IC of the exchange.
The primary contribution of our study is to BPO theory and practice. The study of BPO is salient to information systems researchers for three reasons. First, given that IT is integral to process execution and management in BPO, the IS field is best positioned to leverage its knowledge of IT management to enhance process management in BPO. This argument is consistent with the view of Dibbern et al. (2004) that evolving forms of outsourcing offer an important opportunity to the IS field. Second, industry and academic research (e.g., Borman 2006) suggests that with the growing maturity of the ITO market, ITO is increasingly being bundled with BPO offerings and subsumed into a broader business process decision.
According to Gartner, the delivery of such converged ITO/ BPO services is expected to account for over 40 percent of the total deals by revenue by 2010. They emphasize that, moving forward, an understanding of the issues unique to BPO management is essential for the IT organization. Emergent academic literature in IS also recognizes this trend and recommends that IS outsourcing research move beyond the boundaries of the IS function to include entire information technology enabled business processes (Hirschheim et al. 
2008).
Third, BPO is an example of how advances in IT are ren dering business capabilities more portable so that even core processes like R&D, marketing, or financial planning are moving outside the firm and changing the way firms' value chain decisions shape their competitive position. Agarwal and Lucas (2005) contend that the future of the IS field depends on researchers undertaking research on macro topics that represent the transformational impact of IT.
Despite the salience of BPO research to the IS field for the above reasons, outsourcing research appears to be focused on ITO (Dibbern et al. 2004) , and the field of BPO somewhat neglected in comparison (Borman 2006) with little empirical work that examines BPO performance outcomes (Whitaker et al. 2006 ). Our research is an attempt to empirically study the drivers of BPO performance and address this gap in the literature.
Our study also confirms the important role that the IT organization plays in realizing strategic value from BPO relationships; we find that the greater the complexity and interdependencies of the outsourced process, the greater is the required level of technological investments in process execu tion and coordination. Thus, business leaders must ensure that the CIO is part of the BPO executive leadership, and that the IT organization staff is part of the ongoing team (Torn bohm 2006). As efficiency gains from BPO are driven more by process automation and sophisticated delivery models rather than by labor arbitrage (Singh et al. 2007 ), this linkage between IT and BPO will only become more pronounced.
Finally, the study contributes to the IPV. The latter was developed and tested in the context of intrafirm coordination.
Consequently, interorganizational considerations of incentive conflict are absent from information processing approaches (Argyres 1999) . Further, the ability to facilitate unstructured informal dialog through firm-specific communication codes is a key advantage of organizations relative to market-based contracting (Monteverde 1995) . Thus, in interfirm settings, the means of communication advocated by information pro cessing approaches must consider the added cognitive conflict between independent firms. In this study, we identify struc tural, process, and technological mechanisms that constitute IC of the BPO relationship and provide the incentives and means to process information in the relationship.
A Model of BPO Performance
Information requirements and information capabilities, the key constructs in our theoretical model of BPO performance, 4 While the focus of this study is on process uncertainty and IR, we include a series of controls that account for uncertainty in the BPO relationship and allied appropriation concerns or incentive conflicts that must be managed. 
IR of the BPO Relationship
Research in the information processing tradition largely defines the IR of a firm in terms of the volume of data about organizational activities that is gathered and interpreted by organization actors (Daft and Macintosh 1981) to address uncertainty in the task environment. Thus, we define the IR of the BPO relationship as the amount of information that must be collected, processed, and disseminated across firm boundaries to address uncertainty in the outsourced task environment. Task uncertainty, in turn, has its origin in two task attributes: complexity and interdependence (Daft and Lengel 1986; Galbraith 1973; Tushman andNadler 1978) .
Complexity of the outsourced process is defined in terms of low levels of analyzability and high levels of variety (Daft and Macintosh 1981 ; Withey et al. 1983) . When a process is analyzable, outcomes are well understood, and process admin istrators follow an objective, computational procedure to resolve problems (Daft and Macintosh 1981 ; Daft and Weick 1984) . Low levels of analyzability imply that it is relatively difficult to establish rules, procedures, and predetermined responses to potential problems during process execution and management. Fewer information cues require greater infor mation processing to identify the type of information needed and the utility of that information for the outsourced process (Daft and Macintosh 1981) .
Process variety is defined as the frequency of occurrence of process events that deviate from mean values of stability or uniformity of inputs/outputs, requiring different work pro cesses than is the norm for completion of process objectives (Pentland 2003 ; Perrow 1967) . High levels of process variety result in greater levels of process exceptions and deviations in the outsourced task environment and, hence, greater levels of information processing.
Likewise, the interdependence between the outsourced pro cess and the user firm's value chain also increase the IR of the BPO relationship. The greater the interdependence, the more unexpected and frequent are forced adaptations in the BPO task environment (Daft and Lengel 1986) . Further, the greater the interdependencies of the outsourced process, the greater is the number of process owners and the wider is the extent of impact assessment, bargaining, and reconciliation of dis junctive objectives among these owners (Hirschheim and Lacity 2000) . Process interdependence also necessitates variety in coordination efforts required to transfer value back to the user firm. For these reasons, when the outsourced process is relatively modular and can be analyzed, modified, and enhanced, independent of other organizational processes, the BPO relationship is characterized by lower levels of IR.
The relationships between process complexity, inter dependence, and IR of the BPO relationship are illustrated in Aundhe 2003) and the above theoretical arguments, we suggest that it is useful to think of outsourced business processes along a continuum of IR, levels of which represent the amount of information that must be processed in the relationship to respond to complexity and interdependencies of the process. On one end, we have routine, modular busi ness processes that are managed and executed relatively independent of information changes in the value chain. Next along the continuum are processes that involve rule-based processing of information changes in the task environment.
Complexity of the Task Environment
Interdependencies of the Task Environment
Information Requirements
Of the BPO Relationshp These different points on the continuum are illustrated in Figure 3 in the context of a credit card processing function.
Functions like application form filling or other data entry are examples of modular information processing. In such cases, information exchange between the firms is often limited to batch transfer of process output. Tasks such as new credit card issuance access and record basic customer information, but the structured nature of the information allows much of the business logic to be implemented through rule-based information processing. On the other hand, unstructured informational functions like customer analytics involve access to multiple customer databases, the integration of these databases with data mining tools of the provider, and design of information solutions that link to multiple departments such as marketing and new product development. Expert infor mation services such as the design or marketing of payment products are supported by information solutions such as customer analytics or financial analysis and, often, real-time information linkages to directly deliver critical business outcomes.
The relative complexity and interdependence of the above functions are mapped in Figure 4 .
IC of the BPO Relationship
Each BPO relationship is embedded in a unique process context, and, therefore, differs in its IR. The information processing view of the BPO relationship suggests that observed variations in BPO forms represent strategies to increase participant firms' ability to reduce IR, or increase their capacity to adapt to their inability to reduce IR (Galbraith 1973) . Given the exogenous nature of the out sourced process and IR, the IC design problem in BPO is that of creation of mechanisms through which the user firm and the provider can coordinate their behaviors and actions to address the IR of the BPO relationship and enhance performance.
Information processing theorists (Galbraith 1973; McCann and Galbraith 1981) find that the dominant strategies used by firms to increase their information capacity include greater hierarchy, creation of lateral relations, and investment in information systems. Organizational hierarchies make divi sion of labor and interactions between interdependent actors in the firm more predictable. Lateral relations between organizational actors allow problems to be solved at the level they occur while organizational information systems allow for information processing without overloading the firm's normal communication channels.
However, these strategies do not account for incentive and cognitive conflicts that are unique to interfirm relationships (Argyres 1999; Gulati et al. 2005) . Incentive conflict assumes potential for opportunism and arises from differing private benefits that accrue to independent firms wishing to exchange with each other. Incentive conflict between the user firm and the provider impacts their motivation to process required information accurately (Argyres 1999) . Cognitive conflict assumes lack of availability of a common communication code for independent firms wishing to exchange with each other (Monteverde 1995) and arises due to the lack of a shared understanding of the decision rules inherent to the other firm and mutual interdependencies (Geanakoplos 1992; Gulati et al. 2005 ) . Cognitive conflict between the user firm and the provider impacts their means to process information in a timely fashion. In developing IC of the interfirm BPO Organizational hierarchy is substituted by the governance structure that formalizes the BPO relationship. In addition to sharing the coordination features of organizational hier archies, the interfirm governance structure additionally aligns intent to share information and incentives to invest in allied processes and technologies. Similarly, relational processes perform the function of lateral relations while relational technologies provide the benefits of organizational informa tion systems. Relational processes, in addition to enabling timely information sharing, help overcome diverse inter pretations of changes in the information environment by the user firm and provider to develop shared understandings.
Relational technologies comprise process technologies that enable timely incorporation of information changes in the execution of the process and coordination technologies that increase the amount and frequency of information exchange between firms to reduce information overload in the relation ship. The joint impact of these three mutually reinforcing dimensions of IC has received little empirical attention. Each of these dimensions is described below.
Governance Structure
We define the BPO governance structure as the ownership and control structure used to formalize the relationship, and distinguish among these structures by the level of hierarchical control, length, and extent of formalization. Hierarchical elements in BPO governance include command structures and authority systems, incentive systems, control mechanisms, operating and change management procedures, private ordering mechanisms that bypass courts, and nonmarket pricing systems that enable accurate compensation for changes in task specifications (Stinchcombe 1985) . Some of these elements such as incentive systems or pricing systems pertain to agency features of hierarchical control and address exchange hazards (Stinchcombe 1985) . Yet others, such as command systems or operating procedures, pertain to coordi nation features that reduce the number of information signals that impinge on participant firms. A governance structure is hierarchical to the extent that the control and coordination elements it incorporates "replicate the control and coordina tion features associated with organizations, which are considered to be at the hierarchical end of the spectrum" (Gulati and Singh 1998, p. 781) .
Greater hierarchical control is associated with greater IC of the BPO relationship. This is based on the ability of the agency features of hierarchy to reduce incentive failures through better monitoring and control by fiat (Williamson 1991) , and the coordination features to reduce cognitive failures in networks of division of labor through formalization of roles, shared ownership, and greater systematization (Galbraith 1973; Gulati and Singh 1998) . In this study, BPO governance structures in decreasing order of hierarchical control range from equity sharing structures such as joint ventures to arm's length contracts marked by competitive bidding that have few hierarchical controls built into them.
Consider two examples that illustrate the contrast in hier archical control used to coordinate information between firms and emphasize that such structures are motivated by infor mation processing concerns rather than by exchange hazards alone. The first example is that of an IT services firm in our sample that outsourced benefits management of its employees to reduce costs of process ownership, improve employee satis faction, and focus on its core competencies. To meet these objectives, the service provider developed a web portal for the employees with enrollment, support, and self-service features. In addition, a 24 hour helpdesk service fielded employees' queries and educated them about different bene fits. Since the provider's existing assets could easily scale to provide these process solutions, the user firm transferred ownership of the process to the provider through a fixed price arm's length contract.
The second example is that of a metals manufacturing firm in our sample that also outsourced its human resources function.
Prior association between the firms, the presence of alter native providers, and the potential of repeat business resulted in minimal appropriation concerns. However, the human resources process was characterized by a set of complex and unique information flows to deal with payroll calculations and retirement benefits for different categories of employees, which involved important information on exposure to specific hazardous materials. The labor agreements implicit in these calculations also needed to be frequently updated to reflect changing regulations and market conditions. Finally, the human resources system provided important inputs to pricing modules that generated the final price for quantities of different metals. Given the demanding IR of the task environ ment, the provider could not easily assume sole ownership of the process, prompting the manufacturer to take an equity stake in the provider.
In addition to the level of hierarchical control, we consider two related attributes?length and degree of formalization?
in distinguishing among BPO governance structures. Fears of hold-up are alleviated in longer-term contracts (V?zquez 2007) to provide the incentive to undertake investments in other dimensions of high IC that address high IR. Further, long-term contracts do not need to be negotiated often and yield greater expectations of continuity. Thus, in longer-term contracts, firms are better predisposed to greater information sharing that characterizes high IC. Longer term contracts also provide more opportunity for mutual adjustments in behavior and learning (Anand and Khanna 2000) and improvement in how firms process IR of the relationship. These superior incentives and means to process information in longer-term BPO contracts are consistent with higher levels of hierarchical control in the relationship.
Finally, we posit that the extent of formalization in the BPO relationship or relative emphasis on control versus coordi nation also influences the IC of the governance structure. Greater levels of formalization lower the IC of the relation ship through signaling a lack of trust (Ghoshal and Moran 1996) and shifting the focus and resources of the provider from information exchange aimed at problem solving to defending actions and choices (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003) . Thus, we expect that longer-term BPO relationships with higher levels of hierarchical control and lower degree of formalization will be characterized by relatively greater IC.
Relational Processes
Relational processes in BPO enable timely sharing of infor mation to schedule and synchronize outsourced tasks, clarify task outputs, and integrate outputs back into the user firm's value chain. Following prior research (Bensaou and Venkat MIS Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 1/March 2010 45 raman 1992), we characterize relational processes in the BPO relationship in terms of three dimensions: joint action, commitment, and conflict resolution. Along an increasing continuum, these dimensions represent greater relational embeddedness that affect the extent to which information is freely exchanged in the relationship.
Relational processes are especially important when the required task information is tacit and localized (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003; von Hippel 1994) or cannot be easily trans ferred through the contract. The user firm may have domain knowledge, while the service provider has expertise in executing and managing the outsourced process. These dif ferent information sets must be coordinated for efficient work design. Joint action, commitment, and collaborative conflict resolution complement adaptive limits of the contract to facilitate process execution. TiVo, a manufacturer of digital video recorders, outsourced customer support to rapidly develop distinctive capabilities. Success of the support func tion was contingent on helping customers install, understand, and use the product. TiVo worked closely with its provider to jointly develop processes and training materials that enabled customer agents to "think like a TiVo" customer (Linder 2004) . The agents used the product in their own homes and mastered investigative problem solving techniques to provide superior customer solutions. In turn, the agents provided rich descriptions of customer problems back to TiVo's product development and marketing divisions. This example illustrates how relational processes enable timely information credentialing and access to strategic know-how to enhance IC of the BPO relationship.
As the rate of information change in the task environment increases, the information network between organizational actors must shift from being mechanistic or autonomous to being organismic or highly connected (Tushman and Nadler 1978) . Thus, as IR of the BPO relationship increases, partici pant firms should promote tightly linked relational processes that increase the opportunity for feedback, synthesis of differ ent points of view, and joint decision making that complement limits to adaptability of hierarchical governance structures.
Relational Technologies
The IPV posits that investments in IT increase the information capacity of the firm by reducing the information overload on the firm's communication channels (Galbraith 1973 decision mechanisms, and enable more efficient use of information during task execution (Galbraith 1973 ). All of these capabilities enable complex planning and coordination that is inherent to hierarchical governance structures and tight relational processes. Hierarchical governance structures involve a significantly greater number of embedded rules and routines; IT commits these rules to memory, thereby increasing the viability of these structures (Monteverde 1995) .
IT also supports tight relational processes by reducing information overload associated with extensive ongoing collaboration and providing a communication channel that allows the user firm and the provider to be continuously informed about each other's process decisions and actions (Argyres 1999) .
Given the synergy among these three dimensions of IC, we use an integrated representation of IC comprising the governance structure, relational processes, and information technologies in the BPO relationship. The second-order construct of IC is depicted in Figure 5 .
The Conceptualization of Fit
Fit as a Theoretical Match Between IR and IC
The IPV posits that organizations will be more effective when there is a match between their information processing require ments and information processing capacity of the organiza tion's structure (Tushman and Nadler 1978) . Thus, we posit that the IC of the BPO relationship must "fit" the IR of the relationship to maximize performance, and that over-or underinvestment in IC lowers performance. Venkatraman (1989) identifies six different types of fit?moderation, mediation, matching, gestalts, profile deviation and covaria tion?each with a distinct theoretical implication and requiring the use of specific analytical methods. We con ceptualize fit as a theoretically defined "match" (Venkatraman 1989 ) between levels of IR and IC; we posit that in order to be effective, BPO relationships, which differ in their IR, must be governed by aligned IC, reflected in the choice of struc tural, process, and technological mechanisms in the relation ship. Patterns of fit and misfit between IR and IC are shown in Figure 6 .
We draw on the IPV to posit that if the organization does not consciously match IR and IC, reduced performance standards will automatically ensue in configurations of misfit (Tushman and Nadler 1978) . For example, in configuration C4 in Consequently, performance of configurations C2 and C3,
where IC fit the IR of the relationship, is relatively higher than that of cells C{ and C4, where there is a misfit. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis I: The performance of BPO relation ships that achieve a fit between IR and IC will be higher than that of incongruent relationships whose IC do not fit their IR.
Configurations of Fit: Transactional
and Transformational BPO IR may be minimal or extensive, as shown in Figure 6 , reflecting two dominant classes of BPO initiatives that we characterize as transactional BPO and transformational BPO respectively (Linder 2004) . Given that IR of the relationship is determined by outsourced process complexity and inter dependence, transactional and transformational BPO are characterized by variance in complexity and interdependence of the outsourced process.
Low IR of transactional BPO exchanges reflect high levels of process analyzability and low levels of process variety and interdependence. These process attributes enable a relatively complete specification of contingent obligations and estab lishment of property rights in an arm's length contract with little hierarchical control (Baker 1990; Lee et al. 2004; Uzzi 1997 (Linder et al. 2002) .
On the other hand, the high IR of transformatio initiatives reflects high levels of process complex interdependence. Prior research (Anand and Khan finds that in these initiatives, it is easier to monitor a of partners through more hierarchical contracts than length contracts. Such contracts generate relational rents by providing incentives for value creation (Dyer and Singh 1998) , are long-term, and emphasize coordination over con trol. Information processing in relationships is also enabled by tight relational linkages and sophisticated coordination technologies. This is similar to partnership-like arrangements described in the IT outsourcing literature (Kern 1997) . The user firm and provider are committed to creating value and engage in high levels of joint action, information exchange, and knowledge transfer (Baker 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1992 
Comparative Analysis of BPO Performance Across Configurations of Fit
In this section, we examine performance differences between Prior research (Henderson and Cockburn 1994) finds that architectural competencies that facilitate development of new competences explain significant variance in productivity across firms, suggesting that transformational BPO has a greater impact on the user firm's competitiveness.
This greater reach and impact of transformational BPO initiatives relative to transactional BPO suggests that IC misfit will be more detrimental in such initiatives. The user firm is not only divested of key architectural competences that impact its competitiveness but also, given the greater per vasiveness of the outsourced process, incurs significantly higher costs in terms of organizational disruption relative to transactional BPO. Thus, we posit Hypothesis 2\ The negative impact of misfit on exchange performance is relatively higher in the case of transformational BPO arrangements (marked by high IR) than in the case of transactional BPO arrangements (marked by low IR).
Empirical Analysis Data Collection
The data for this study were obtained through a survey of senior executives responsible for the management and review A seven point Likert scale was used for most questions;
however, some questions involved binary choices.
The desired sample included small to large organizations across diverse industries that had outsourced one or more business process. Our target list drew on active compilations of outsourcing firms, industry association referrals, and out sourcing advisory referrals. Related research on ITO, in surveying executives, defines populations and response rates based on those who will pre-commit to respond (Poppo and Zenger 2002) . The normative response rates based on pre committed samples are as high as 40 percent (Anderson and Narus 1990) . A total of 600 pre-committed surveys were mailed, with follow-up letters five weeks later. We received a total of 145 valid responses of which 127 were complete in all respects. This response rate of approximately 24 percent was slightly lower than expected, and was likely due to the lengthy and extensive nature of the questionnaire. However, it is consistent with rates in similar surveys in the literature (Pavlou et al. 2007; Poppo and Zenger 2002) . The final sample was representative of a range of outsourcing objec tives for which there was sufficient variance in task attributes.
All respondents were assured that their responses would remain confidential and that results would be reported only in aggregate, thereby addressing privacy concerns and mini mizing potential bias in self-reported data. To test for potential response bias, we compared the firm size in the sample to the larger population. The sample and population did not appear to differ in terms of firm size. We also com pared questionnaires turned in early with questionnaires turned in later along a number of variables?firm size, industry, respondent position, exchange attributes and service satisfaction?to check for nonresponse bias (Armstrong and Overton 1970; Poppo and Zenger 2002) . No significant differences were found between early and late respondents.
We also checked for the presence of common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003) and concluded that common method bias did not likely impact survey responses.
Finally, a section of the raw data was also randomly subjected to independent cross validation exercises. For a random sample of 25 firms, we requested the respondent firm to identify the vendor for the outsourced process for the purpose of a brief interview. Ten firms obliged, and we interviewed the vendors for the outsourced process to obtain relevant process information. The two information sets in the user firm-provider dyad were mutually consistent.
Measures Exchange Performance
Our use of service satisfaction as a key performance metric is consistent with prior measures of outsourcing performance found in the information systems literature (e.g., Grover et al.
5The subject experts comprised directors of strategic outsourcing practices in Fortune 100 firms (in financial services, healthcare, retail, and high-tech), outsourcing advisory consultants, leading service providers, and academicians.
1996; Marcolin and McLellan 1998). Satisfaction is a proxy
for perceived effectiveness in working partnerships like BPO (Barber and Venkatraman 1986; Poppo and Zenger 2002) . It is also a significant determinant of future actions, including repeat business, positive word-of-mouth, and loyalty (Barber and Venkatraman 1986) . Its use as a performance metric is also supported by the argument that high levels of satisfaction represent realized performance expectations (Dibbern et al. 2004 ). However, since performance goals often relate to the overall cost and quality of service, prior research (Lee and Kim 1999; Poppo and Zenger 2002) has largely emphasized satisfaction with service quality, where measures of the latter are based on the SERVQUAL instrument (Parasuraman et al. 1985) .
In this study, we measure the user firm's level of satisfaction with four dimensions of service: reliability, responsiveness, systematization, and innovation (Sureshchandar et al. 2002) .
Reliability refers to the ability to perform contracted services dependably and accurately. Responsiveness reflects willing ness to help customers and provide prompt service. Systema tization refers to the processes, procedures, systems, and technology that make a service a seamless one. Innovation refers to the ability to leverage process knowledge to deliver a range of process enhancements that go beyond performance expectations of the user firm and contracted service level agreements. Measures of these four dimensions are adapted from Sureshchandar et al. (2002) . Our measure of innovation is also consistent with the literature on service innovation and delight (Hipp and Grupp 2005; Oliver et al. 1997) . The use of these four dimensions of satisfaction is consistent with recent research, which finds that there is a need to study performance outcomes in BPO beyond the traditional outcomes of quality and cost (Whitaker et al. 2006 ). We measure satisfaction on a seven-point scale where "1" represents highly dissatisfied and "7" represents highly satisfied.
Explanatory Variables
IC is developed as a second order construct with governance structure, relational processes, and information technologies as first order constructs. Factor scores for the integrative latent representation of IC were used in subsequent analyses.
Measures of the three dimensions of IC are adapted from prior research. The governance structure is identified by the degree of hierarchical control (Gulati and Singh 1998) , the length of the relationship, and the degree of formalization or relational emphasis on control versus coordination (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995; Gulati and Singh 1998; Tushman and Nadler 1978) . Relational processes are identified by the levels of commitment (Gardner and Cooper 1988) , extent of joint action (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995 ; Heide and John 1990) , and (collaborative versus adversarial) conflict resolu tion (Linder 2004; Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995) . The extent of use of relational technologies is measured by the scope and intensity of use of IT in the outsourced process, and sophistication of coordination systems (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995) .
In order to perform a comparative analysis of performance performance between low and high IR for a given level of investment in IC. We test whether Satisfaction(IC=l, IR=1) -Satisfaction(IC=l, IR=0) and Satisfaction(IC=0, IR=0) -Satisfaction(IC=0, IR=1) is positive and significant.
The t-tests also provide preliminary evidence of whether misfit has a more pronounced impact on transformational BPO relative to transactional BPO {Hypothesis 2). We test whG?ier Satisfaction(IC=0, IR=1) -Satisfaction(IC=l, IR=0)
is negative and significant. Venkatraman (1989) suggests that in order to test fit as a theoretical match between two variables, the residuals from the regression of one variable (in this case, IC) on the other (in this case, IR) must be related to the criterion variable (in this case, satisfaction). Thus, in order to estimate the per formance impact of fit between IR and IC, we first estimate a first stage probit selection model of IC choice as a function of IR of the BPO relationship.
Prpr^l) = (?' } + , (1) IC misfit, which is the absolute value of the residual6 from t first stage model, is incorporated in second stage OL regressions of satisfaction. Incorporating this measure fo high (low) IC provides a test of performance of firms th invested in high (low) IC but had good reason to invest in (high) IC, that is, it provides a test of overinvestment (un investment) in IC.
Our two stage regression model also enhances the validity the residual analysis by correcting for endogeneity of choice. Firms self-select the observed IC based on their o analyses of performance outcomes. The failure to correct f unobserved firm and transactional factors that simultaneo influence IC choice and performance produces biased, inc sistent estimates (Heckman 1979; Leiblein et al. 2002) .
account for possibly endogenous IC choices, we construct t inverse Mills ratio, ? using the predicted probabilities fr the probit model. The errors com and are assumed to be distributed normally and independently, with mean zero and constant variance. 0 and yl capture the correlation of the "unobservables" of the selection equation (1) with the "unobservables" of the per formance equations j = 0 and j = 1 respectively; thus, a test of whether y0and y7are statistically different from zero measures the endogeneity of IC selection. In both stages, we use z scores for all variables to account for measurement differences. A negative and significant coefficient for IC misfit provides support for Hypothesis 1. A positive and significant difference between the coefficient of IC misfit for low IC (j = 0) and that for high IC (j = 1) provides support for Hypothesis 2.
Results

IR of the BPO Relationship
The adjusted R2 for the regression of observed IR on com plexity and interdependence of the outsourced process is 0.40.
Regression weights for both variables are significant at the 1 percent level. The correlation between predicted and observed IR is nearly 0.66, indicating good fit. Further, all results reported below are robust to the use of both observed and predicted IR.
IC of the BPO Relationship
Correlations among the three first-order dimensions of IC are significant but below the limit of 0.90 (Bagozzi et al. 1991 ).
Hence, a second-order factor model comprising an integrative latent representation of IC is useful in explaining such corre lations (Segars and Grover 1998) . Table 2 presents the factor loadings for the second-order IC construct, while Table 3 provides the factor loadings for the first-order dimensions of IC. All loadings are significant and of high magnitude.
We find a significant positive correlation between IR and IC.
The Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.58 is significant at the 1 percent level, providing preliminary evidence of fit.
Performance Impact of Misfit: T-tests of Performance Differences Table 4 presents the results of t-tests of performance dif ferences between low IR (IR = 0 and high IR (IR = 1) for both choices of IC. We find that investment in low (high) IC
when IR is high (low) has a significant, negative impact on performance, providing preliminary support for Hypothesis 1.
The magnitude of such impact is higher for low IC for nearly all dimensions of satisfaction, implying that the negative performance impact of underinvestment is higher than that of overinvestment. This result provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 2.
Switching Regression Estimates: First-Stage Governance Choice Estimates Table 5 presents Multicollinearity issues were investigated by examining variance inflation factors (VIFs) and condition indices for the predictor variables. Near multicollinearity is a problem if VIF is greater than 10 (Hayter 1996) or the maximum condition index (CI) for the model is greater than 30 (Myers 1990 ). An analysis of these measures suggested that the coefficients in Model III for all the measures of performance were biased by near multicollinearity. The VIF for misfit and lambda were greater than 10. The maximum CI for the model was also greater than 30, and the variance proportions associated with the index suggested that the dependencies involved variables lambda and misfit. We used the residual regression method (Chung and Charoenwong 1998) within each of these categories. We believe that clusters of these three attributes will help in the development of richer typologies of BPO relationships.
The integrated representation of IC for transformational BPO initiatives also provides a conceptualization of the partnership construct for use in future research. Dibbern et al. (2004) , in their review of the IS outsourcing literature, note that out sourcing partnerships are variously defined as the sharing of risks and rewards (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994) , the development of long-term relationships (Klepper 1995) , and in terms of attributes of user firm-service provider interactions such as trust and communication (Grover et al. 1996) .
Further, these conceptualizations of outsourcing partnerships do not examine the underlying contractual structure, sug gesting that their results must be interpreted cautiously (Grover et al. 1996) . For example, Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) Our result regarding the adverse influence of misfit on performance helps resolve conflicting findings in the literature (Dibbern et al. 2004) involving the impact of partnerships on exchange performance. For instance, Grover et al. (1996) conclude that the establishment of elements of partnership such as trust and communication are important determinants of outsourcing success. However, Lacity and Hirschheim ( 1993) find that viewing a relationship as a partnership can be dangerous because it may lead to a loose or incomplete contract, in part because the client thinks of the outsourcing vendor as a partner when in fact it is not, thereby engendering appropriation concerns. This study emphasizes that the effec tiveness of investments in partnership structures is contingent on the nature of the underlying outsourced task; such investments are beneficial when the underlying task is com plex and marked by interdependencies, yet they are costly and inefficient when the task is simple and modular.
In addition to supporting the overall positive impact of fit between IR and IC on performance, this study finds that misfit between IR and IC in transformational BPO initiatives results in significantly higher levels of dissatisfaction with service reliability, responsiveness, and innovation than transactional BPO. However, the two classes of relationships do not differ in terms of satisfaction with service systematization. This result is consistent with differing impact and expectations across the two classes of BPO relationships. Although trans actional BPO initiatives may engender steady improvements in operational efficiency through reduction of process errors, they do not generate competitive advantage since there is nothing idiosyncratic about the exchange relationship. On the other hand, transformational BPO initiatives enable parti cipant firms to uniquely combine, exchange, or invest in idiosyncratic assets, thereby realizing relational rents and competitive advantage. Thus, when the expectation to "out innovate" is not met in these relationships, dissatisfaction is pronounced. Further, in transformational BPO, the negative impact of the inability to reliably execute the process or respond to dynamic business requirements is widely felt in the user firm. Our results suggest that underinvestment in IC does not impact standard procedures that enable seamless service provision. Rather, they impede achieving the greatest benefits from outsourcing. In our study, these benefits translate to higher levels of reliability, responsiveness, and process innovation.
The study has important implications for BPO practice as well. Industry surveys find that many firms are strongly dissatisfied with BPO agreements, and that many do not expect any cost savings to materialize. This study identifies key issues that determine positive business outcomes in BPO and outlines a holistic strategy that helps achieve these outcomes.
Conclusion HHHHHHH
Our study adds to the literature on firm boundaries, and emphasizes that as outsourcing matures to being a collabo rative network paradigm that is increasingly strategic in its impact, attention must be paid to issues of work design and coordination. We empirically demonstrate that the extent to which firms can accurately predict their IR of control and coordination and design IC that are aligned with such IR is an important determinant of their ability to leverage BPO.
The central role of IR in BPO relationships may be investi gated more closely. Given that an understanding of IR is important for the efficient design of information mechanisms and coordination capabilities in outsourcing relationships, the IR of the BPO relationship may well influence the funda mental choice of firm boundaries. Thus, future research could examine the role of IR as an important basis for why firms exist. Further, while in this study we conceptualize IR in terms of the amount of information that must be processed to address the complexity and interdependencies of the out sourced process, future studies may explicitly examine other important aspects of information requirements such as quality and visibility, and how the choice of IC in the BPO rela tionship addresses these requirements.
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, it treats IR of the BPO relationship as an exogenous construct. However, in a continuous feedback system marked by important learning processes, the user firm will likely adjust IR and its antecedents to better align with the IC of the relationship.
This may give rise to an endogeneity issue, which results in inconsistent OLS estimates. The results of Hausman's speci fication test for endogeneity of IR in our model indicate that OLS produces consistent estimates and is efficient. It is likely that endogeneity does not impact our results because learning effects develop over longer periods of time. However, it is important to recognize that as the goals and expectations of the user firm and provider evolve with time, the IR and IC of the BPO relationship also evolve as does their
In the current study, we have only cross-sectio limits our ability to provide a richer conceptu relationship between IR and IC. A multiper address this issue and introduce a dynamic pe examines how governance forms change o evolving expectations and goals of participant Second, our measure of observed IR does no amount of information processed by the serv However, our use of regression scores for IR, p attributes of the outsourced process, helps add since IR is measured at the process level and n level. Further, as a robustness check, we mea service providers for a subsample of outsourc correlation between the two measures of IR wa 0.60, suggesting that the two information sets consistent.
Third, we do not consider objective measures of efficiency recorded in service level agreements (SLAs) in the contract. However, given the nascent and topical nature of BPO, such data are difficult to obtain from user firms for reasons of confidentiality. Further, given the heterogeneity in BPO objectives (for instance, innovation versus cost savings), allied strategic importance of the outsourced processes, and ensuing timeline of returns from outsourcing, it is difficult to reconcile BPO contracts and SLAs in terms of a singular measure of performance. Thus, our measures of service satisfaction create defined anchor points and represent the best alternative. Yet, future research must consider per formance outcomes that reflect the unique nature of the BPO engagement. This is especially true as BPO matures, engendering substantial and sustainable transformation in firm performance (Linder 2004) .
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study makes important contributions to the literature on the organization of outsourcing relationships. Comprehensive data on transaction and relational characteristics of a range of BPO relationships allows us to take an early step toward understanding the drivers of performance of this rapidly growing form of out sourcing relationships. The results yield an important under standing of the value of BPO and are useful to user firms for designing relationships with the service provider. This, in turn, enables the user firm and the provider to define and enact clear expectations that impact competitiveness.
